Abstract: Fuzzy Commitment Scheme is a popular technique for biometric template protection. The idea is to bind an random bit string with a biometric template in binary format called difference vector. Ideally, a difference vector is infeasible to recover either the biometric template or the random bit string without any knowledge of the user's biometric data. Yet, this is only valid if the biometric template is uniformly random, which is not the case in reality. In this paper, we propose a method known as Randomized Dynamic Quantization transformation to binarize biometric data. The transformed bit strings are highly distinctive among the users and near to uniformly random. We demonstrate the implementation in the context of fingerprint biometrics.
Introduction
Modern biometrics delivers the enhanced level of security by means a "proof of property". It means that the claimant measures properties concerned with intrinsic human characteristic such as fingerprint, iris, face etc directly, and this differs in important ways to the provision of security by means of a password or by possession of a token.
The design and deployment of a biometric authentication system, however hides many pitfalls, which when underestimated can lead to major security weaknesses and privacy threats. Issues of concern are biometric identity theft and privacy invasion because of the strong binding between a user and a user identity. Another concern is that the biometric samples cannot be reproduced exactly. To make things worse, biometric templates, once comprised are difficult to revoke or replace.
One solution to tackle the abovementioned issues is to employ recently proposed secure template protection primitives, known as Biometric Encryption (BE) (refer [1] for comprehensive review). Generally, BE consists of two components: identifier binding, Bind, and extraction Extr. Given an enrolled biometric template, X and an externally generated random bit string (identifier hereafter), Id, such as password, PIN, cryptographic key etc, a BE template, T =Bind(X, Id) is constructed. Theoretically, T is infeasible or it is computationally hard to recover either the template or the Id without knowledge of the user's biometric data. It turns out that it is not necessary to tie unique biometric data to individual at the authentication phase, but instead for a given T and a live biometric sample X' then Extr(T, X') will yield Id if X'≈X. In such a case this means that Id is being used as the identifier for authentication and biometric template is thus protected.
Motivation
The criticism on BE is that a true secure BE template, T is difficult to design. The non-uniform nature of biometric feature (low entropy) can be exploited by an adversary through the statistical analysis to break T.
Specifically, we study one of the popular BE techniques, namely Fuzzy Commitment Scheme (FCS). FCS was proposed by Juels and Wattenberg [2] . The scheme works as follow: at enrolment, let a binary biometric feature denotes as x, an identifier, Id, a difference vector, L =Id +x, error correction parity checksum, parity(Id), a fuzzy commitment {L, hash(Id), parity(Id)} is formed and stored. The + is an XOR operation. During verification, Id' =L+x' is computed and corrected using parity(Id) and hashed where x' is a query biometric sample. hash(Id') = hash(Id) if and only if x ≈ x' up to a certain error correction threshold.
A practical implementation of FCS was done by Hao et al. [3] . They used an Daugment's IrisCode, which is available in a form of 2048-bit string and a concatenated Error Correction Code, namely Reed-Solomon code and Hadamard code, to reduce the errors of recovered Id. Their algorithm shows remarkably good performance where FRR =0.47% at 0% FAR for a 140-bit key based on iris data. However, the iris dataset used in their experiments is free from degrading factors such as illumination, focusing variations, occlusion of eyelashes, etc. Besides that, the paper also show that if an adversary manages to know the correlation pattern of the IrisCode, the security is reduced to 44 bits, which is low in practice.
There are two challenges to utilize FCS in biometric template protection. Firstly, L should not leak any information for either Id? or x in proving the authentic template protection. It follows that the task of an attacker in deciding is equivalent to the task, given knowledge only of hash(Id) or hash(x), of finding a string s such that hash(s) = hash(Id) or hash(s) = hash(x). This can achieve only if both x and Id are uniformly random and so for L. In our context, the randomness of Id is not a concern as a high entropy bit string can be generated easily from crypto-secure random number generator. The center issue is the transformation of the biometric template from its feature space into a bit string. Besides the high entropy requirement, the transformed bit string should be distinctive enough among the users.
From the system perspective, a highly distinctive biometrics bit string will facilitate the Error Correction function to recover Id due to the nature of XOR implementation in FCS.
In this paper, we propose a biometric feature binarization technique known as randomized dynamic quantization transformation (RDQT). RDQT is able to produce a high entropy as well as stable bit string for a user which satisfies the requirements of FCS. We demonstrate the implementation in the context of fingerprint biometrics on FVC 2002.
RDQT is first defined as B = Ψ(x){0, 1} k where x . denotes biometric feature, Ψ is the RDQT and k is the length of bit string. The design requirements for RDQT are as follow: 1) Randomness. For any input x, B should be approximately uniform distributed among all possible 2 k outputs. The randomness of B can be measured by using the discrete Entropy, which is defined as H(x) = -ΣPr(x)log 2 Pr(x) where Pr(x) denotes bit probability and maximum bit unit entropy is 1 [4] . For B with length k, the entropy of B is H(B) =k bits if B is uniformly random.
2) Uniqueness. The RDQT bit strings of different persons, B and B' should be approximately independent. The purposes are two fold: (1) to facilitate the recovery of Id by using Error Correction function and (2) to avoid an adversary creates collisions easily since he could predict the response of h(Id) to recover Id if B and B' are not independent.
Randomized Dynamic Quantization Transformation
Randomized dynamic quantization transformation comprises of three steps: (1) Random Projection [5] , (2) Dynamic Quantization and (3) Condensation.
Random Projection
The random projection consists two stages: (a) feature extraction and (b) random projections (RP). Firstly, a feature vector, x, with fixed length n is extracted from the raw biometric data. The feature vector is then projected onto a random subspace which constituted by the random matrix, R ∈ mxn where m < n. R is chosen independently from N(0, 1) and distinctive for every individual and can be derived by using the user-specific information such as seed (which stores in the secure device like smart card), password etc.
The random projection is defined as v (1/m) =Rx. Note that v is a set of underdetermined systems of linear equations (more unknowns than equations). If R and v are given, it is impossible to find the exact values of all the elements in x by solving an underdetermined linear equation system in v (1/m)=Rx . if m < n, based on the premise that the possible solutions are infinite. This implies that the RP is non-invertible and it is also used to increase the level of randomness of B.
Quantization, Dynamic Thresholding and Condensation
Dynamic quantization converts a random projected feature element's i of user j, v = {v ij | i = 1,. . . ,m} into a binary bit which comprises of two steps: (1) Quantization, (2) Dynamic Thresholding Quantization is first mapped each random projected feature element's i of user j, v ij into the quantized domain, Q ij . To setup Q ij , the smallest and the largest values of user j's random feature vector can be determined from the training data set: Next, the quantized domain Q ij for i-th component of user j is computed by using μ-law quantization,
, where 0 < μ < 1 is a free parameter. Logarithmic scale allows quantization intervals to increase with magnitude, and it ensures that low-magnitude features are quantized with a minimal loss of information. For the implementation, we store Min j , Max j (individual specific). For the sake of security concern of not revealing the actual quantized values, Q ij , dynamic thresholding is carried out iteratively to determine the best threshold value, α opt . First, the initial threshold value, α 0 is arbitrary set to Q ij /2, the half of the range of quantized values, and split the Q ij interval into two parts, U 1 and V 1 . The mean values of U 1 and V 2 are computed, denoted as m 1 (U 1 ) and m 1 (V 1 ), respectively. The next threshold value is then set to α 1 = (m 1 (U 1 ) + m 1 (V 1 ))/2. The interval splitting and mean calculation process are repeated based upon the two computed mean values, m i (U i ) and m i (V i ), until the threshold values become stable, ie. α i−1 ≈ α. i and α opt = α i . We set Q ij to 1 if it exceeds α opt or otherwise.
Note that α opt is not stored, but only be calculated on the fly when it is needed. Compare to a global fixed threshold value which can be guessed and exploited easily, α opt is not likely to be estimated. This renders the inversion process becomes infeasible or computationally hard.
Finally, we perform a row-wise modulo-two operation onto h i to generate a new set of bit string. The row-wise modulo-two operation XORs the first and the second elements of h and the same operation is carried out to the rest until the length of h is condensed to the half. Condensation eliminates small perturbations in quantization procedure, thus reduce the intra-class variations of genuine population.
Evaluations
The evaluations of the proposed technique and FCS system are (a) the uniqueness property of B, (b) randomness property of Band (c) Id recovery success rate in FCS. We use DB1 fingerprint dataset from FVC2002 (http://bias.csr.unibo.it/fvc2002/). The dataset consists of 100 classes and each class contains 8 fingerprint impressions. Every image is performed core point detection manually. A 128x128 square region centered in the core point of the fingerprint images is cropped. Multichannel Gabor Filter (FingerCode) [6] is used to extract fingerprint features. The outcome is an ordered feature vector with length 1226, but the feature length is reduced to m = 750 after Random projection stage. The length of bit string will be condensed again to k = 750/2 = 375 after DQ and binarization process. We randomly select 3 samples from each class to determine the Min and Max values in equation (1) . False Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Rejection Rate (FRR) and Average Error Rate (AER), where AER = (FAR+FRR)/2 are adopted to access the uniqueness of B.
We first compare the performance of FingerCode against RDQT bit string. The effect of μ with 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 are examined. Table I tabulates the AER results for the experiments. We observe that all settings of RDQT improve FingerCode (AER=23.17%) as desired. The best performed μ-law quantizer is μ = 0.6 with 0.7% Table I . AER for FingerCode and μ-law quantizers with various settings. To examine the randomness of B, we calculate the entropy of each RDQT bit strings empirically. Fig. 1 shows the average entropy distribution of 500 (5x100) RDQT fingerprint bit strings with k =375. We obtain a mean of 0.92 (0.94x375=345 bits) and standard deviation of 0.13 (≈49 bits), thus the empirical bound is in between [296 375] bits. Compare to the ideal entropy bound of B with 375 bits, the degradation is not significant. This also imply that an adversary have to randomly guess at least 2 296 combination of bitstrings, which is far beyond the capabilities of modern computers.
AER(%)
One should note that if an adversary manages to obtain the user-specific quantization range ie. {Min j , Max j }. We should consider the information leakage of B due to {Min j , Max j }, ie. H(B|{Min j , Max j }). As described in section 3.2, quantization is done before dynamic thresholding and condensation, these two process obscure the information of quantized values, this induces nothing can be learned from B based on {Min j , Max j }, hence H(B |{Min j , Max j }) = H(B).
To evaluate the success rate of Id recovery, we redefine FAR and FRR. Here, FRR id is defined as the error rate that the legitimate user's identifiers are failed to be extracted and the FAR id is defined as the error rate that the legitimate user's identifier are produced from the imposter's fingerprint. Note that decoded identifier Id' should be identical to the original identifier Id, ie. h(Id') = h(Id), therefore we set FAR id = 0% and acquire FRR id .
For error correction function, we adopt Reed-Solomon code [7] , ie. RS(K, S) with K-symbols codewords and S is the number of information digits and it corrects up to t = (d − 1)/2 errors where d is the minimum distance of the code. parity(Id) is equal to K-S symbols. Since RS(K, S) does not exists for all K and S we choose from the list of possible combination, ie. (15, 7), (15, 9), (15, 11) and the best setting which delivers the lowest error rate, ie. μ = 0.6 for the experiments. We note from Table II that the best ECC, RS(15,7) is able to attain 0.9% of false rejection rate. This indicates that only 9 out of 1000 correct Id are failed to be generated and the recovery success rate is up to 99.1%.
Conclusion
Fuzzy Commitment Scheme (FCS) is a biometric template protection technique which enables biometric features to be concealed and a number of identifiers can be assigned to different applications. To utilize FCS, the biometric feature has to be appeared in binary format. The bit string should be uniformly random and distinctive among the users. We devise a biometrics to binary bitstring transformation technique, known as Randomized Dynamic Quantization Transformation (RDQT), which satisfies the randomness and uniqueness properties. We also evaluate the identifier recovery success rate of FCS based on FVC2002 dataset.
